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I. INTRODUCTION

Civil litigators in Texas would be completely baffled by the discovery
phase in a criminal case. The contrast between discovery in civil and criminal
litigation, until very recently, has been extraordinary. Civil litigation practice
usually involves relatively little trial work and a great deal of discovery
activity.' Discovery is not unknown in criminal litigation, but often has been
* Professor of Law and Co-director of International Legal Programs, St. Mary's University School
of Law. I am grateful for the background research assistance of Malori Carley, and I especially thank my
research assistant, Sarah Bassler, for her thorough and important contributions to this project. Thanks
also to my St. Mary's colleagues, Professors Michael Ariens, Vincent Johnson, John Schmolesky, and
Stephanie Stevens for their helpful comments, suggestions, and insights.
1. All civil litigation cases must be governed by a discovery control plan, which allows for a
continuous flow of evidence and information regarding the trial. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.1. The openness
between case materials, evidence, and information allows parties to acquire full knowledge of the facts
involved in the dispute, which often leads parties to find a suitable compromise without trying the lawsuit.
GERALD S. REAMEY & CHARLES P. BUBANY, TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 315 (11th ed. 2013). Section
9 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the rules pertaining to discovery in all civil cases. See
generally TEX. R. Civ. P. 190-215.
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defined more by investigation and the exploitation of procedures not
designed for that purpose than by the variety of effective discovery tools
available in any civil case.2 Interrogatories and requests for admissions
simply do not exist in criminal cases. Depositions are available only in
theory.3 The decision whether to disclose material favorable to the defendant,
which is required by due process, lies with the prosecutor whose failure to
comply may, but easily may not, be discovered after the fact.4 And until very
recently, so many limitations existed on the scope and timing of required
disclosures that the information released to the defense was often too little,
and came too late. 5

2. See REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 1. The disparity between criminal and civil discovery is
not apparent just by reading the rules. Id. Rather, the disparity can be seen from studying the cases that
interpret the rules and realizing that discovery opportunities are very limited in scope. Id. As a result of
the limited access to discovery, criminal practitioners have been forced to find other ways to discover the
prosecution's case. Id.
3. In James v. State, the appellant sought depositions from various people involved in the case who
had useful information. See James v. State, 563 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The appellant
expressed his reasons for needing the depositions in an affidavit, which included the officers' refusal to
discuss any facts of the case with the appellant's court-appointed private investigator or attorney; the fact
that a complainant in one of the related cases was out of state; and that two complainants, one of whom
was the victim, had moved since the initial investigation and the Assistant District Attorney would not
disclose their addresses. Id Despite the establishment of these facts, the court denied the appellant's
request to take the depositions, stating that the appellant did not prove he had good reason to take their
depositions and, therefore, that the denial was not harmful to him. Id at 602-03. "The trial court has wide
discretion in either granting or denying a motion for taking a deposition." McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d
536, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), abrogatedby Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
"[Tlhe fact that witnesses of whom depositions are requested are adverse witnesses is not enough standing
alone to show an abuse of discretion in denying the motion to take a deposition." Id. In the event the
motion requesting depositions is denied, the party must demonstrate harm to establish an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. See James, 563 S.W.2d at 602.
Failure to request a deposition, however, may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See
generally Frangias v. State, 450 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that defense representation
was deficient because counsel did not seek to depose an unavailable witness who could have corroborated
defendant's potentially exculpatory testimony). In holding that a failure to request a deposition was
deficient representation in Frangias, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cited and distinguished
numerous cases in which trial courts denied such requests, all affirmed on appeal. See id at 141 n.43. The
court's opinion impliedly condemns requests for depositions based on "a bald and belated attempt at
discovery" without explaining why defense discovery by deposition is inappropriate, even if it comes
shortly before trial. See id. at 141. The implication seems to be that depositions are for the purpose of
perpetuating testimony due to witness unavailability and not for discovery generally.
4. See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxii (2015),
http://georgetownlawjoumal.org/files/2015/06/KozinskiPreface.pdf
Federal appellate Judge Alex
Kozinski recently noted the difficulty in unearthing violations of the obligation to reveal exculpatory
information to the defense:
Prosecutors and their investigators have unparalleled access to the evidence, both inculpatory
and exculpatory, and while they are required to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense
under Brady, Giglio, and Kyles v. Whitley, it is very difficult for the defense to find out whether
the prosecution is complying with this obligation.
Id.
5. See Cynthia E. Hujar Orr& Robert G. Rodery, The MichaelMortonAct: MinimizingProsecutorial
Misconduct, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407, 412 (2015) ("Texas has traditionally recognized only limited pretrial
discovery.").
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Wide-open discovery in civil matters reflects the sensible view that
resources should not be wasted on the litigation of issues about which the
parties agree. 6 As often happens, parties in possession of complete
information about the merits of a case are able to arrive at a reasonable
settlement, confident that no important unknown evidence would
significantly change the outcome.7 Why, then, would criminal defendants
not be entitled to the same access to information? Wouldn't that lead to more
settlements, just as it does in civil cases? 8 And isn't it even more important,
given the high stakes involved in a criminal prosecution, to arrive at an
informed and fair resolution? Isn't that in the interest of everyone?
Truth-finding is an important goal in every criminal justice system, but
it is not always the highest value to be served.10 In the United States, for
example, exclusionary rules prevent fact-finders from learning of probative,
even crucjal, evidence regarding guilt or innocence." Simple rules of
evidence inpede the jury's ability to judge on all the facts, facts that might
better help it ascertain the truth. Hearsay is excluded because the jury might
not appreciate its unreliability; significant documents go unseen because they
cannot be )roperly authenticated." Although these rules are intended to filter
out what ntay be untrue, they cannot succeed without sometimes also filtering
out what is true. This burden to the truth-finding function is deemed less
harmful generally than the risk of admitting everything.1 3
Similarly, rules that prevent the accused from having access to all
evidence collected by the prosecution may serve other values at the expense
of truth-finding and justice. The arguments against criminal defendants
having the wide-open discovery available to parties in a civil suit usually boil
down to two: (1) giving a person accused of a crime full information about
evidence, including witnesses, that will be used against him facilitates
coercion, collusion, and evidence tampering;1 4 and (2) due to constitutional
6.

See REAMEY & BUBANY, supranote 1.

7. See id.
8. S. CoMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013). As
the authors of discovery reform noted in their Bill Analysis,
[Open file discovery] promotes efficiency in the criminal justice system. A defendant who
understands the extent of the evidence against him can make an informed decision to plead. It
also allows for a full defense, lessening the likelihood of an overturned verdict on appeal. The
state saves thousands of dollars in appeals, incarceration, and potential compensation for
wrongful convictions."
Id.
9. R. Marc Ranc, Two Views ofMorton, 77 TEX. B.J. 964, 966 (2014) (stating that prosecutors and
defense attorneys are all officers of the court and integral parts of the judicial system who want justice).
10. See Gerald S. Reamey, The American Exclusionary Rule Experience, in EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EU AND BEYOND 191, 192 (1999).

11.
12.

See id.
See id. at l91.
13. See id.
14. See Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine:Some New Reflections
on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 221-22 (2005); see, e.g., Ranc, supra
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guarantees afforded to the accused, it is impossible to have fully reciprocal
discovery because it would give the defendant an unfair advantage in the
adversarial contest.' 5
Regarding the first of these, the fear of witness intimidation or worse is
not borne out by the experience in other countries. 6 In most advanced legal
systems, the defense receives-often early in the process and without
requesting it-all of the evidence collected by the police and prosecution."
Some cases of collusion, evidence tampering, and threatening witnesses must
exist in these systems, but do not seem to be widespread or sufficient to
restrict the flow of information to the defense. 8 And despite the limits on
disclosure of prosecution evidence in the United States, such abuses have not
been eliminated entirely.' 9 While judges should be able to order suitable,
tailored protections for witnesses and evidence in individual cases, a rule that
blocks disclosure exacts a high cost from all defendants, especially in the
absence of a legitimate cause for concern.
The reciprocity argument is one peculiar to adversarial systems. 20
Because the trial process is viewed as a competition, each side will seek an
advantage. 2 1 An advantage to one party will often be a disadvantage to the
other, making the process "unfair." 22 In a non-adversarial system, the kind
used in most developed countries, there is, in theory at least, only one "side,"
represented by the truth.23 Full disclosure in these systems is seen more as a
note 9, at 965. Mr. Ranc, a former prosecutor in Williamson County and now a criminal defense attorney,
described this argument:
The district attorney would further assert the idea that if the prosecution gave the defense an
open file, the information would prompt the defendant to concoct a story in defense of the
accusations against him or her. I think most defense attorneys would agree that this idea is
preposterous... . Until the very end, the belief was propounded that if the state's files were
completely open, then the state could never win a prosecution.
Ranc, supra note 9, at 965.
15. Ranc, supra note 9, at 965 (argument from former prosecutor); see 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

260 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the

constitutionality of discovery by the government); W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Right of Prosecution to
PretrialDiscovery, Inspection, and Disclosure,96 A.L.R.2d 1224, 1226 (1964) (arguing that reciprocal
discovery violates the right against self-incrimination).
16. Cerruti, supra note 14.
17. See id. at 214-15, 253-55 (discussing how the principle of transparency in criminal justice has
entered an era of disclosure in foreign and international systems of law).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 636-37 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ ref'd)
(upholding the conviction of a defendant who threatened to kill a prospective witness in retaliation of her
testifying); Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (upholding the bail
amount of a defendant who solicited another to kill his wife to prevent her from testifying).
20. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 403, 439-40 (1992); Gerald S. Reamey, Innovationor Renovation in CriminalProcedure:Is the
World Moving Toward a New Model ofAdjudication?, 27 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 693, 708 (2010).
21. See Van Kessel, supra note 20, at 443-44.
22. See id. at 484-85.
23. See Mirjan Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 525 (1973) (stating that some sources of
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means for facilitating a just result by arriving at the truth rather than as an
advantage or disadvantage in a contest in which truth is revealed by the
combat of competing champions. 24 In an adversarial environment, discovery
rules that favor either party will be seen as unfair, and as possibly thwarting
the ends of justice. Never mind that even the most rigorously adversarial
system is inherently unbalanced and therefore always unfair in some sense,
the appearance of an uneven playing field smacks of a poor design that leads
to unreliable results.2 5
Rights guaranteed to the accused admittedly prevent any true reciprocity
of discovery in criminal cases.26 Taking the deposition of the accused, for
example, could not meaningfully be required. The guarantee against
compelled self-incrimination prevents it in a way that has no counterpart for
a complaining witness. 27 Requiring production of correspondence between a
defendant and her attorney would interfere with the constitutional right to
counsel, but at least in that instance similar protections safeguard
correspondence between prosecutor and witness, even if they do so less
robustly.2 8
Impediments to full reciprocity of discovery do not necessarily produce
a lopsided adversarial process. Laying aside the inherent advantages enjoyed
by the prosecution through its unmatched access to investigative resources,
an approximation of reciprocity can be achieved if discovery rules are crafted
to preserve the adversarial balance (to the extent constitutionally permissible)
while simultaneously extending the defendant's access to information.29
Prior to 2014, Texas discovery law provided safeguards against
improper use of evidence and against the unbalanced access to that evidence
by the parties, but it also inhibited the ability of the criminally accused to
obtain useful material from the state in a timely fashion.3 0 Capable defense
lawyers were often required to find informal means of discovery to gather
facts by requesting records pursuant to the Texas Open Records Act, filing
applications for bail reduction, or filing petitions for habeas corpus relief.
Examining trials were used, not for their statutory purposes, but to substitute

information are rejected in the American system due to fear of unreliability, while others are rejected to
advance other values); Van Kessel, supra note 20, at 417 (arguing that so-called inquisitorial systems rely
on neutral and detached judges rather than "upon presentation of evidence by interested 'advocates' to an
unprepared fact finder"); Reamey, supranote 20, at 699 (stating that lawyers shape and control all aspects
of trial in America, while Continental judges are active participants in their system).
24. See Van Kessel, supra note 20, at 454-55.
25. See Reamey, supra note 20.
26. See sources cited supra note 15.
27. See Crais 111, supranote 15.
28. See id at n.12.
29. See S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
30. Id.
31. See REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 1 (arguing that, due to limited criminal discovery,
practitioners have been forced to use unconventional methods to discover the prosecution's case).
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as a rough-and-ready, but very limited, kind of deposition. 32 Unimaginative,
impatient, or lazy lawyers simply made no effort and negotiated guilty pleas
for their clients based on no more than a short summary of the facts provided
by the prosecutor or by their own partially informed client. In some counties,
prosecutors adopted an "open-file" policy, but in others, defendants were
dependent on the trial judge to order the production of evidence.33
Unfortunately, Texas law gave a defendant the right to no more discovery
than due process requires.34
The promise of an open-file policy, in those counties in which one
existed, sometimes provided an illusory kind of disclosure.35 Access to a
so-called open file promised nothing beyond the minimal information to
which the defendant is entitled under due process, and maybe not even that.36
The file given to the defense counsel was almost certainly not the entire case
file. 3 ' Even generous disclosures of information would not include work
product. Would the file include everything else in the possession of the state?
Would it include non-Brady materials in the hands of law enforcement or
other state agencies? There simply was no way short of a court's disclosure
order to ensure that open access was full access.38
Even if complete prosecution files were made available to the defendant,
access often was so restricted that it inhibited actual use of the materials.
For example, for a considerable time the Bexar County District Attorney's
Office, to its credit, maintained an open-file policy.4 0 Defendants and their
attorneys, however, were not allowed to photocopy, scan, or photograph
32. See id. at 221 (stating that a suspect obtains "some discovery" in examining trial). The use of
the examining trial as a discovery vehicle, however, is easily curtailed or eliminated by obtaining an
indictment prior to arrest, or even prior to the time the examining trial can be scheduled and conducted.
See generally Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding that the return of an
indictment terminates the right to an examining trial), overruled by Bradford v. State, 608 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Failing these measures, a prosecutor always retains the oplion of simply
presenting no evidence at the examining trial, which results in the defendant's release, only to be rearrested when the indictment returns.
33. See Ranc, supranote 9, at 965 (stating that some district attorney's offices had liberal open-file
policies while others were much more restrictive).
34. See BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611.
35. See Ranc, supra note 9, at 965.
36. See id.
37. Opening the file to defense counsel might be conditioned on an agreement not to share the
information with the accused, and pro se defendants could be denied access altogether. This very kind of
"conditional release" of information was considered in Opinion No. 646 of the State Bar of Texas
Professional Ethics Committee, which determined that following enactment of the Michael Morton Act,
prosecutors could not ethically require defense counsel to agree not to share information from the file with
their clients. Tex. Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 646 (2014), 78 TEx. B.J. 78 (2014). Prior to the Act, this
practice was not prohibited, and presumably, conditional release of material not covered by the Act
remains an option. See id.
38. See Ranc, supra note 9, at 965.
39. See id
40. See Elizabeth Allen, Bexar DA's Open File Policy Called "Inferior" by State's Defense
Lawyers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 30, 2007), http://markstevenslaw.com/wp-contentl
uploads/2014/09/1328106896_174.news_1.pdf
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pages within the files. 4 1 Attorneys of record could inspect the file, read it,
and take notes of its contents, but not reproduce it.4 2 This daunting task
effectively discouraged even diligent lawyers, especially in cases with
voluminous files like those often accompanying white-collar-crime
prosecutions and other major cases.43 Copying by hand, organizing, and
indexing hundreds or thousands of pages was simply impractical. Even in
less challenging cases, the chore required considerable time and expense.4
Other conditions, like restricting the hours files were available for inspection,
further impeded defendants in some counties with open-file policies.
The risk of wrongful conviction is high in an adversarial system in
which defendants are systematically denied information about the state's case
until it is revealed at trial. In the case of a Texas defendant named Michael
Morton, this risk was realized.
II. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

Christine Morton was murdered in her home in 1986.45 The crime was
a grisly one with only one eyewitness-her three-year-old son.46 Despite his
insistence that his father, Michael Morton, had not committed the murder,
investigators almost immediately suspected Michael of bludgeoning his wife
to death. 47 None of the evidence that was gathered substantially supported
this suspicion, and some of the evidence contradicted it, but Michael Morton
was arrested, tried, and convicted of the crime.48 Without belaboring the facts
of this case, which have been extensively chronicled elsewhere, suffice it to
say that the prosecuting district attorney allegedly ignored or deliberately
withheld potentially exculpatory evidence that came to light during the
41. See id A similar policy existed in the Travis County District Attorney's Office. See Ranc, supra
note 9. Some offices, including the Williamson County District Attorney's Office-the office that
prosecuted Michael Morton-had an even more restrictive view of open-file policy. See id
42. See Ranc, supra note 9. This procedure changed somewhat in Bexar County after the San
Antonio Criminal Defense Lawyers Association negotiated an agreement with District Attorney Susan
Reed that the Association would rent a copier and pay for its necessary supplies in exchange for being
provided copies of certain information in the DA's file. See Allen, supra note 40.
43. See Allen, supra note 40. Bexar County District Attorney Susan Reed said in response to
criticism of her office's no-copy policy, "What can I say? I don't make it as easy as everyone else." See
id.

44. See id. Bexar County criminal defense attorney Mark Stevens was quoted about this process:
"(Recently) I just spent an hour and a half in an office dictating a file. My secretary is probably going to
have to spend seven or eight hours on that transcription." Id Needless to say, the impact of this policy
was to greatly increase defense costs to the individual defendant or to the county in cases in which counsel
was appointed.
45. See Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man, Part One, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 2012) [hereinafter
Colloff, Innocent Man, Part One], http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/the-innocent-man-part-one;
Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man, Part Two, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter Colloff, Innocent
Man, Part Two], http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-innocent-man-part-two.
46.
47.
48.

See Colloff, Innocent Man, Part One, supra note 45.
See id.
See id.
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investigation. 4 9 After serving almost twenty-five years of a life sentence,
Michael Morton was released from prison and exonerated once the
undisclosed evidence came to light.so Subsequently, former District Attorney
Ken Anderson, by then a sitting Texas District Court judge, was removed
from the bench, forced to surrender his law license, and sentenced to serve
ten days in jail as part of a settlement in a civil misconduct suit and contempt
proceeding against him.5
The timing of Morton's release in October 2011 could not have been
better for the purpose of provoking law reform. Publicity surrounding the
case became unavoidable when Texas Monthly magazine ran a lengthy
two-part article describing in great detail the failures of investigation and
disclosure that led to Morton's wrongful conviction.5 2 This was preceded in
March by a 60 Minutes interview on CBS that focused on prosecutorial
misconduct and the devastating effect of the conviction on Michael Morton's
life. 5 3 Efforts to amend Texas's general criminal discovery statute were fed
by increasing interest in the compelling story of a man who suffered
immeasurable loss by the murder of his wife, the alienation of his young son,
and decades spent in a Texas prison, all due to apparent failures to recognize
and disclose exonerating or mitigating evidence. 5 4 By the time the Texas
Legislature convened in Spring 2013, calls for reform were impossible to
ignore. Adding to the momentum was Michael Morton's demeanor. Quiet,
respectful, forgiving, and never vindictive, he simply and persistently called
for reforms that would prevent others from suffering his fate." The
conviction in March 2013 of Mark Allan Norwood for murdering Christine
Morton set the stage for legislative action.56 DNA evidence linking Norwood

49. See id.
50. See Colloff, Innocent Man, Part Two, supra note 45.
51. Chuck Lindell, Ken Anderson to Serve 10 Days in Jail, AM.-STATESMAN (Nov. 8, 2013, 5:02
PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/ken-anderson-to-serve- I0-days-in-jail/nbmsHi.
52. See Colloff, Innocent Man, Part One, supra note 45; Colloff, Innocent Man, Part Two, supra
note 45.
53. 60 Minutes: Evidence of Innocence: The Case of Michael Morton (CBS television broadcast
Mar. 25, 2012).
54. See Lindell, supra note 51. Mr. Morton's release was delayed further by the refusal of
Williamson County District Attorney John Bradley to agree to DNA testing. See id.; Kozinski, supra note
4, at xxxi (stating that many innocent defendants spend years fighting to obtain evidence that would
exonerate them).
55. Opinion, Morton Case Callsfor System Reforms, AM.-STATESMAN (Mar. 30, 2012, 7:06 PM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/morton-case-calls-for-system-reforms/nRmbm ('"My life
is great,' Michael Morton told the American-Statesman's [reporter] this week. 'I have been blessed in a
million ways, more than I can count."'). Since his release, Morton has been on a mission to change the
law, hold prosecutors accountable for their misconduct, and keep innocent people from suffering the same
fate that he faced. See Brandi Grissom, Senate Unanimously Approves Michael Morton Act, TEX. TRIB.
(Apr. I1, 2013), www.texastribune.org/2013/04/I /senate-approves-michael-morton-act/.
56. Pamela Colloff, Mark Alan Norwood Found Guilty of Christine Morton's Murder, TEX.
MONTHLY (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/mark-alan-norwood-found-guilty-ofchristine-mortons-murder.
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to another woman's murder after Michael Morton's wrongful conviction
made that action irresistible."
III. THE Focus OF REFORM

The Morton case highlighted a systemic failure, but what would fix it?
An obvious answer seemed to be to give defendants more access to evidence
gathered by the state.18 If Michael Morton's trial lawyer had known that a
suspicious green van was seen parked behind the house when the crime
occurred, that a blood-stained bandana was found where the van was parked,
or that Morton's son described a "monster"-not his father-in the house
when his mother was killed, the result might have been different.5 9
Prosecutors have always had a duty to disclose exculpatory material and
impeachment evidence; however, much of the information in the state's
possession that could be useful to the defense-but not exculpatory or

'

potentially exculpatory, or exculpatory but not "material" to the issue of
guilt-could be withheld.60 Even if evidence is clearly exculpatory and
material, its disclosure may be delayed until the trial is actually underway.6
Clearly, disclosure satisfying the minimal due process standard does not
guarantee that defendants have everything necessary to mount an effective
defense against the state's case or that they will receive information in time
to make best use of it. 62
To supplement the disclosure requirement of Brady v. Maryland,3
Texas criminal procedure law includes a general discovery provision. 64 Until
2005, that provision, article 39.14, permitted, but did not require, a trial judge
The
to order the state to produce certain items in its possession.6 5
discretionary nature of article 39.14 assured that application of the law was
uneven.6 6 Some trial judges ordered extensive disclosure of prosecution
materials, while others routinely denied requests for production of anything
57.

See id.

58.

See S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013)

("Recent high profile cases in Texas show that with open file discovery, the likelihood that evidence
relevant to the defendant's innocence would have been revealed is increased.").
59. See Colloff, Innocent Man, Part One, supra note 45; Colloff, Innocent Man, Part Two, supra
note 45.
60. See Randall Sims, Two Views ofMorton, 77 TEX. B.J. 964, 965 (2014).
61. See Losoya v. State, 636 S.W.2d 566,571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ) (citing Juarez
v. State, 439 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)).
62. See BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611 ("Brady is vague and open to interpretation, resulting in
different levels of discovery across different counties in Texas.").
63. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
64. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.).
65. See Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), overruledon othergrounds
by Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 488-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
66. See BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611 ("A defendant's chances to a fair trial often vary according
to jurisdiction, because of the lack of a uniform discovery law.").
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beyond the constitutionally mandated minimum. 6 7 In response to calls from

the Texas defense bar for strengthened discovery options, the Texas
Legislature amended article 39.14 in 2005 to include mandatory language:
Upon motion of the defendant showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to the other parties, the court in which an action is pending shall order
the State before or during trial of a criminal action therein pending or on
trial to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the defendant of any designated documents, papers, written
statement of the defendant, (except written statements of witnesses and
except the work product of counsel in the case and their investigators and
their notes or report), books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in the possession, custody
or control of the State or any of its agencies.68
As well-intentioned as this amendment may have been, it remained easy
to circumvent. Couched in terms reminiscent of Brady, the mandate applied
to production in a "pending" action or when a defendant was "on trial." 69
The trial judge could comply with article 39.14 by allowing the state to defer
production until the trial was actually in progress. Making the best use of
exculpatory material or valuable impeachment facts in the midst of trial is
difficult and often impossible, and a request for trial delay to develop newly
discovered evidence or prepare effective cross-examination is rarely met with
enthusiasm and generosity by the trial court. Further, the statute was limited
to "material" evidence that was in possession of the state or its agencies.
Often, facts that may not by themselves be material will nevertheless be
important to the defense. In this sense, article 39.14 never functioned as a
true discovery statute, but only as a kind of safety net to prevent the worst
kinds of unfairness to the accused.
The most significant deficiency of the 2005 version of article 39.14,
however, was the preliminary requirement of a showing of "good cause" by
the defendant." This placed the burden of requesting production, along with
a burden of showing good cause (a term undefined by the statute), squarely
on the defense.72 Trial judges, who were reluctant to order disclosure of the
state's case, could rely on an abuse of discretion standard to protect the denial
of a production order based on the defendant's failure to show good cause.7 3
To make matters worse, if the trial judge granted the defense's request, the
67. See id.
68. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.; Orr & Rodery, supra note 5 (noting that a defendant could inspect limited discoverable
items only on a showing ofsufficient good cause).
72. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a); Orr & Rodery, supra note 5.
73. See Walker v. State, 321 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. dism'd).
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state's failure to comply with a production order was also reviewed for abuse
of discretion.74 In short, it was entirely possible following the 2005
amendment of article 39.14 for a criminal defendant to receive no more than
the minimum disclosures required by Brady v. Maryland." Even if this
iteration of the statute had been in effect when Michael Morton was
prosecuted, he might have been no better off.
IV. THE Fix: A NEW AND IMPROVED DISCOVERY STATUTE

If "the truth shall set you free," or better, if the truth has the power to
prevent the accused from being wrongfully imprisoned, then more disclosure
of information in the possession of the state better serves the interest ofjustice
than less disclosure. In essence, this simple argument motivated the 2013
amendment to article 39.14, known as the Michael Morton Act (the Act).7
Responding to apparently well-founded claims that vital information was
withheld from Michael Morton, the 83rd Texas Legislature approved a broad
mandate requiring the state's production of material in its possession upon
the request of a defendant.
V. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE ACT

The kinds of items and information to be produced under the Act are far
more varied than the disclosure required by Brady. Without regard for
whether this material exculpates or casts doubt on other anticipated trial
evidence, amended article 39.14 includes "offense reports, any designated
documents, papers, written or recorded statements of the defendant or a
witness,. . .books, accounts, letters, photographs, or objects or other tangible
things" that are not privileged, as long as these items are "in the possession,
custody, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state."7
As extensive as this list is, it failed to include the names of any expert
witnesses that either side may use at trial. 79 The Texas Legislature provided
for those disclosures in the next regular session following the enactment of
74. See id. at 22-23.
75. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
76. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2013). Michael Morton prefers that the
amendments to article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure embodied in Texas Senate Bill
1611 of the 83rd Texas Legislature be referred to as "SB 1611" rather than "the Michael Morton Act."
Interview with Michael Morton (May 14,2015). The bill, however, specifies that the provision be known
as the Michael Morton Act, so that is the way in which it is referred to in this Article. See Michael Morton
Act, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106-08 (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 39.14).
77. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a); see also Orr & Rodery, supra note 5, at 413-19 (describing
characteristics of the Michael Morton Act).
78. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a). Note that the requirement extends to agents of the state and
not only to persons working as full-time employees of the state. See id.
79. See id. art. 39.14(b).

904

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:893

the Michael Morton Act.8 0 Effective September 1, 2015, upon request of a
party "made not later than the 30th day before the date that jury selection in
the trial is scheduled to begin or, in a trial without a jury, the presentation of
evidence is scheduled to begin," the party to whom the request is made must
disclose the name of any expert witness that may be used at trial."
Not included in the Act's original laundry list is "work product of
counsel for the state in the case and their investigators and their notes or
report." 8 2 More broadly than for work product, the Act exempts "written
communications between the state and an agent, representative, or employee
of the state."8 Notwithstanding these limitations, the sweep of the disclosure
requirement is breathtaking in comparison with what previously existed.84
To be fair, remember that prior to passage of the Act, some prosecuting
offices, particularly but not exclusively in larger cities, maintained an
open-file policy that simultaneously provided extensive discovery
opportunities for defendants and protection from Brady violation claims for
those offices.8 '
Recall that, because open-file policies were largely
gratuitous, their scope and the operational procedures by which they were
implemented varied greatly. Even for those defendants fortunate enough to
be prosecuted in a county with such a policy, there was no guarantee that
everything in the file would be made available, or that the defense would
know what had been withheld.
Since no right existed to see material not
covered by Brady, an open-file policy was only as useful as the willingness
of the prosecution to make full disclosure.
80. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.).
8 1. Id.
82. CompareTEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2013), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis. Sess.). It may be significant that the
exception extends only to state's counsel involved "in the case." A reasonable implication is that the work
product of counsel for the state may be subject to production if that lawyer is not involved in the
defendant's case. A related question concerns whether the requirement of amended article 39.14 trumps
any general work-product privilege.
83. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.).
84. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2005). Note that under the prior version
of article 39.14, a trial judge could exercise discretion in favor of disclosure and order the same kinds of
materials covered by the amendment. See supranotes 71-75 and accompanying text (explaining the Texas
Legislature's amendment to article 39.14 and its shortcomings). While some judges may have done this
in some cases, the Author is unaware of any evidence that this practice was prevalent.
85. See, e.g., Ranc, supra note 9, at 965-66 (discussing the impact of open-file policies before the
Act was passed).
86. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing how practitioners approach the openfile policy). For example, the Bexar County District Attorney's Office maintained an open-file policy for
a considerable period of time, but would not allow defense counsel to photocopy or photograph any
materials in the often-voluminous files. See Allen, supra note 40.
87. See Allen, supra note 40.
88. See Ranc, supranote 9. No doubt, in some cases an open-file policy allowed a defendant access
to more than she was entitled to receive under Brady or more than a trial judge could order under the
existing statute. See Allen, supra note 40.
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The Act goes beyond creation of a mandatory open-file policy for
prosecutors.89 It redistributes the burden of discovery. 90 While the state's
attorneys have long had the duty to produce Brady material, discovery of
other information in the possession of the state or its agents required the
defendant to request its production, and then to show good cause for the trial
court to order its release. 9 1 A simple request from the defendant for material
covered by article 39.14 now activates the prosecutor's duty to produce the
requested items, assuming of course that those items are ones for which
production is required.92
VI. THE REQUEST

Unlike the procedure previously in place, the current statute creates a
virtually atomatic disclosure duty. The defense need not show cause for
productiod because, for the most part, the trial judge has no decisions to make
once disclosure is requested. Article 39.14 does not specify whether the
defense request be written, but only that it be "timely." 95 Presumably, a
request is timely if it is made sufflciently before trial to allow the prosecutor
to respond. Failure to expressly request material under article 39.14 amounts
to relying on Brady and its due process minimum disclosures, and may be
seen as a tacit waiver of the right to production of non-Brady material.
Relying on an open-file policy in lieu of making a 39.14 request also
may be ineffective, and even dangerous, for the defense. An open-file policy
is, by its nature, a voluntary and discretionary policy in which no one is
accountable for incomplete disclosure. The Michael Morton Act has been
characterized as creating mandatory open-file discovery."
That
characterization, however, is misleading. The Act specifies the objects and
materials that must be disclosed upon request by the defense, while the
traditional open-file policy maintained by many prosecutors' offices prior to
passage of the Act was as broad or narrow and as inclusive or exclusive as

89.

See supra Part IV.

90.

CompareTEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2005), with TEX. CODE CIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis. Sess.).
91. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (explaining the Texas Legislature's effort to
strengthen the discovery rules).
92. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.).
93. See supraParts III-IV.
94. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a); Ranc, supra note 9, at 965.
95. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a).
96. See id. (stating that the duty arises "as soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from
the defendant").
97. See Ranc, supra note 9, at 965; Allen, supra note 40.
98. See Ranc, supra note 9; see also Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, supra note 37 ("article 39.14
requires an 'open-file' policy by prosecutors").

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

906

[Vol. 48:893

'

the office wished it to be within the confines of due process.9 9 The mandate
of article 39.14 is not merely a command to open the prosecutor's file; it is a
structured command to be applied in a uniform manner, requiring disclosure
of many items while protecting the confidentiality of others. 0 0 In this way,
disclosure is not dependent on a local prosecutor's policy concerning the
contents or definition of the file; it is access that is statutorily required and
clearly defined.' 0
A request might be made by the defense in a variety of ways. 102 It could
be delivered orally-say by phone call or a passing comment in a courthouse
hallway-but doing so is fraught with the usual possibilities that drive
lawyers to memorialize in writing virtually everything. Making the request
in a letter avoids many misunderstandings and miscommunications, but a
careful lawyer might choose instead to continue the practice that existed
before the Michael Morton Act by filing a motion for production.
Although filing a motion seemingly defeats the goal of extricating the
trial judge from routine discovery requests, it is unlikely to increase the
court's burden. In addition to requesting material available under article
39.14, the production motion will undoubtedly request the court to order the
state to disclose anything material to the case that is exculpatory-that is,
information to which the defendant is entitled under Brady v. Maryland.03
While Brady material need not be requested specifically, careful defense
lawyers always do. 10 4
99. See Ranc, supra note 9, at 965; Allen, supra note 40.
100. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a). One of the shortcomings of an open-file policy is that the
lawyer making the materials available can determine, without any more guidance than conscience and the
due process floor, what is to be included within the file. See Nathaniel Burney, Is Open File Discovery a
Cure for Brady Violations?, CRIM. LAW. (Feb. 28, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://burneylawfirm
.com/blog/2012/02/28/is-open-file-discovery-a-cure-for-brady-violations/.
A prosecutor could, for example, maintain a separate file of witness statements or forensic reports,
which would not be available to defendants despite the availability of an apparently complete file
containing offense reports and other materials. See Brian Rogers, New Law Forces Prosecutorsto Turn
Over Evidence Against Suspects, HouS. CHRON. (May 17,2013,9:04 AM), http://www.houstonchronicle.
com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/New-law-forces-prosecutors-to-turn-over-evidence-4522558.
php. This disclosure of the state's file would not necessarily be incomplete in any obvious way, but it
would not include items any criminal defense attorney would think were important for trial. Selection of
items to omit might also be entirely ad hoc, further masking the incompleteness of the file that was "open"
to the defense. Few prosecutors acting in good faith would fail to disclose these limitations to defendants
viewing the file except in cases of innocent or inadvertent mistakes, but in the absence of a more stringent
guiding principle than generosity, no consequences or remedies exist for such a failure.
101. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a). Compliance with the defense's request cannot ethically be
conditioned with an agreement from the criminal defense attorney that information produced will not be
disclosed to the defendant or that a blanket waiver be made of court-ordered discovery in any of their
client's cases. See Tex. Comm. on Prof I Ethics, supra note 37. Prosecutors are required to comply with
the Michael Morton Act. See id.
102. In this context, "the defense" actually refers to the attorney representing the accused. Pro se
defendants are subject to somewhat different rules and limitations.
103. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
104. In the past, defense lawyers developed the habit of requesting Brady material to fall under the
"request" standard, which resulted in a somewhat more lenient review in cases of alleged failure to
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In addition to asking for Brady material and information discoverable
under article 39.14, the motion is often used to request production of evidence
in the state's possession that is neither obviously exculpatory nor obviously
included within the scope of 39.14.105 For example, certain tangible objects
like drugs or pieces of physical evidence may be subject to inspection under
the long-standing rule of Detmering v. State.'06 Some of those items might
be within the language of article 39.14 relating to "any designated books,
accounts, letters, photographs, or objects or other tangible things not
otherwise privileged that constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and that are in the possession, custody, or
control of the state or any person under contract with the state."'0o Until it is
clear that "material to any matter involved in the action" includes evidence
subject to Detmering, prudence dictates making a specific request. 0 8
Finally, a motion filed in the trial court is usually the best evidence that
the defense actually made a request. It is unclear from the Act whether the
defendant may waive production, or if so, whether that waiver must be
explicit and what form the waiver should take.' 0 9 Lest a claim the defense
made no request results in a later allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the prudent defense attorney will hesitate to rely on less definitive
methods of communicating a request. For the prosecution, too, an explicit
written request-by a motion for production-eliminates ambiguity and
clearly defines its obligations."1 0
In most cases, trial judges are unlikely to labor over routine 39.14
requests. Their decision-making burden is usually eliminated by the

disclose than the "non-request" standard. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976). When that distinction ended, lawyers may have continued
the practice of requesting Brady material due to force of habit, a lack of awareness that the standard had
changed, or simply a desire to have the trial court rule favorably on at least one part of the motion for
production. A motion and order to produce Brady material also has the salutary effect of forcing the
prosecution to consider, hopefully for the second time, whether the material exists and previously has been
disclosed.
In addition to the constitutional requirement, the defendant is entitled to Brady material under
subsection (h) of article 39.14:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the state shall disclose to the defendant any
exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item, or information in the possession,
custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to
reduce the punishment for the offense charged.
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h).
105. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a).
106. See Detmering v. State, 481 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
107. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a).
108. See id,
109. See, e.g., Sims, supranote 60, at 966. If waivers are permitted, as seems likely, they cannot be
compelled by the state in exchange for the prosecution's compliance with the disclosure mandate of the
Michael Morton Act. See Tex. Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, supranote 37.
110. See Sims, supra note 60, at 966.
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mandatory nature of the Act."' No determination of good cause is required;
the order of production should become routine in the ordinary case." 2
VII. PRODUCTION

Once a request is made, it is incumbent on the prosecutor to produce the
requested materials "as soon as practicable."" 3 In a simpler case, compliance
might be possible in a very short period of time, but in other cases the
prosecution requires an extended period in which to gather and transmit the
information.1 14 The Act provides no further guidance on the timing of the
request or the time within which the state must respond.' 5 Nor does it require
the trial court to allow the defendant any particular amount of time (or even
a "reasonable" amount of time) prior to trial to read, consider, and react to
what he or she has learned.1 16
For a prosecutor receiving a request under 39.14, compliance can be
challenging and time-consuming. One prosecutor described the situation this
way:
[A]lready overloaded prosecutors' offices must put together discovery on
each case, provide it to the defense, and document which items were
provided and when-all with the same number of employees. Many offices

are also filing with the district clerk a 39.14 Notice of Discovery, which
enumerates the items given to the defense, as well as keeping a copy for
their case file and providing a copy to the defense attorney at the same time
they convey the discovery it documents.
Making this trickier, a few offices are paperless, so discovery (both in
the state providing it and in the defense receiving it) occurs electrollically.
But the vast majority of prosecutors' offices still use paper, at least to some
extent, and the task of duplicating case files, video recordings, audio clips,
and other evidence has burdened stretched-thin staff, budgetl, and
equipment. Such paper-pushing offices have a couple of choices. The first
is to make paper copies of everything for the clerk and defense counsel. The
second is to go electronic by scanning the discovery items and report and
then providing an electronic copy to the defense by email, cloud storage,
thumb drives, or something similar while retaining the electronic file. The
majority of district clerks in Texas are already mandated to be fully
paperless on civil matters, and it is coming soon for criminal cases. Perhaps
prosecutors should start moving that way with discovery. "7

Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a).
id.
id.
Sims, supra note 60.
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a).
id.
Sims, supra note 60, at 965-66.
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The absence of language in the Act requiring a response to a request for
production within a certain time creates the possibility that a prosecutor,
perhaps for understandable reasons, will delay production of the material for
an unreasonably long period. Agreeing to a continuance or resetting of the
case, however, does not cure the harm done to the defendant in this
circumstance. While many criminal defendants are in no rush to resolve the
charges against them, many others are sitting in jail cells, unable to make bail
and unwilling to plead guilty or demand trial without having had access to
the state's evidence against them. The hydraulic pressures of this situation
all work against the goals of a more expansive discovery regime. Without
invoking the intervention of the trial court-the very thing the Act was
intended to reduce or eliminate-the defendant is left to wheedle, beg, and
threaten to obtain what the Act ostensibly guarantees." 8 Delay in the
production of information also necessarily delays the preparation of the
defense case for trial. Minimally, the statute should require, as other similar
provisions do, that the defendant have a reasonable period in which to digest
the material, and sanctions should be available for flagrant abuses of the
production requirement. 119
Even after the state discloses everything in its possession that must be
disclosed, its duty is not satisfied. The Act creates a continuing duty of
disclosure that requires the prosecution to "promptly disclose the existence
of the document[s], item[s], or information" to the court or defendant if any
of these are discovered at "any time before, during, or after trial." 20
Materials discovered even years after the conclusion of a trial must be
disclosed, something that potentially facilitates the discovery and
advancement of both claims of actual innocence and claims ofBrady or 39.14
violations.121
But what about a witness statement that is unknown to the prosecutor,
such as a discoverable document found languishing in the file cabinet of a
suburban police department because it was overlooked or because an
investigator decided without consultation that it was unimportant to the case?
The answer to this question is clear under Brady v. Maryland.122 Material
that is favorable to the defendant and in possession of the government or
those acting on its behalf must be disclosed.1 23 In essence, this rule creates a
prosecutorial duty to find and disclose such information.' 24 Texas law now
appears to impose the same duty on prosecutors with respect to article 39.14
materials.1 25
118.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

S. COMM. ON CUMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
See TEX. R. EVID. 615(d)-(e).
See CluM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(k).
See id.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1963).
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
See id.
See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (k).
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Subsection (a) of article 39.14, which creates the request and disclosure
doctrine, extends to documents, papers, statements, and objects "that are in
the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract
with the state."' 26 Given that "the state" is not defined within the Act, and
that prior versions of article 39.14 did not overlap with Brady v. Maryland,
the reach of the prosecutorial duty to find and disclose non-Brady material
remains somewhat unclear, but the requirement of disclosure of Brady
material in subsection (h) certainly suggests that adherence to the
constitutional understanding of "possession" should control in some cases.1 27
Consistency in this regard would create a better integrated duty to disclose,
and, in a practical sense, the prosecutor is always burdened with ensuring that
items in the "possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under
contract with the state" are made available to the defendant.1 28
Some material in the possession of the state need not be produced in
response to an article 39.14 request. For example, inspection and copying of
designated documents, papers, and written or recorded statements of the
defendant or a witness is permitted, but that right does not extend to "the
work product of counsel for the state in the case and their investigators and
their notes or report." 29 In- another provision, the statute provides, "The
rights granted to the defendant under this article do not extend to written
communications between the state and an agent, representative, or employee
of the state." 30 The latter exclusion of written communications is quite
broad, but presumably does not extend to offense reports, which are
specifically listed among those items to be made available to the
defense.131 To exclude offense reports or witness statements of law
enforcement officers-also expressly discoverable-would defeat much of
the purpose of the Act and would violate the general principle of statutory
construction regarding the primacy of the specific provision over the
general.1 3 2
Unsurprisingly, if a prosecutor decides that information may be
withheld, that decision must be revealed to the defense.' 33 "The state shall
inform the defendant" if the state has withheld or redacted some portion of
an item, giving the defense an opportunity to challenge the omission. 134 A
defense request initiates that challenge, which, in turn, requires the trial court
to conduct a hearing to determine whether the failure to disclose was

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id.
See id. art. 39.14(h).
See id. art. 39.14(a) (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 311.026 (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis. Sess.).
See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c).
See id.
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justified.' 35 The language of the Act is mandatory in this regard, specifying
that "the court shall conduct a hearing" on the issue once it is raised, but it
does not indicate how quickly the hearing must be held."'
Requiring the prosecution to reveal incomplete disclosures serves the
interest of the state in protecting privileged or otherwise protected
information, while giving the defense notice that something is missing. 3 1
Rather than burdening the state and courts with the filing of a request for a
protective order in advance of any disclosure, the procedure permits the
defense access to material that clearly must be disclosed, leaving the validity
of a claimed exception to disclosure for a later hearing.13 8 The disadvantage
of this procedure, from the defendant's point of view, is that in the absence
of a request for a hearing to review the prosecution's decision to withhold,
the justification for the omission or deletion is tacitly conceded. It is
incumbent on defense attorneys, therefore, to either obtain a satisfactory
explanation for nondisclosure from the state's attorney or test the action by
requesting review in the trial court.' 39
VIII. WHEN COUNSEL'S ACCESS EXCEEDS A DEFENDANT'S-THE PRO SE
DICHOTOMY

One of the peculiarities of the amended language of article 39.14 is that
the word "defendant" apparently means "defendant's lawyer" rather than the
actual accused person. Subsection (a) requires the state to produce
documents, papers, statements, or objects upon "request from the
defendant." 4 0 Ordinarily, a reference to "the defendant" includes both the
accused and the defense attorney; in the case of subsection (a), it appears that
either may request disclosure.' 4 ' Indeed, the statute provides that "after
receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce and
permit the inspection and the electronic duplication, copying, and
photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant, of [any discoverable
materials]." 4 2 Although subsection (a) does not differentiate between lawyer
and client, other portions of the Act clearly do, often in a manner seemingly
at odds with the initial command.
The thrust of these distinctions is to give the defendant's attorney access
to all of the material proffered by the state but to deny the actual defendant
135. See id.
136. See id. (emphasis added).
137. S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
138. See CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c).
139. See id.
140. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (emphasis added).
141. See id. No distinction is drawn in subsection (a) between the accused and defense counsel, and
there is no hint in the general command of that provision that access differs according to the status of the
person requesting it, as long as that person is legally identified as "the defendant." See id
142. See id. (emphasis added).
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the same access. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that the defendant should
not receive materials upon request without the involvement of the court. 143
Indeed, the plain words of that provision clearly name the defendant as the
requesting party, and require the state to produce reports, documents, papers,
and statements and "permit the inspection ... by . .. the defendant."l44
In subsection (d), however, the following appears:
In the case of a pro se defendant, if the court orders the state to produce and
permit the inspection of a document, item, or information under this
subsection, the state shall permit the pro se defendant to inspect and review
the document, item, or information but is not required to allow electronic
duplication as described by Subsection (a).1 45
Without prior mention or explanation, the quoted language raises two
inferences: (1) a pro se defendant, unlike one represented by counsel, must
move for production of article 39.14 materials; and (2) production,
inspection, or review is required only if it is ordered by the trial court. 4 6
Nothing is said about the standard by which the court will decide a production
motion filed by a defendant, and nothing seems to prevent the state from
allowing that defendant access to an open file containing the same materials
even without a court order.' 4 7
In the absence of statutory guidance, is production for a pro se defendant
left entirely to the whim of the court? Is the decision subject to review for
abuse of discretion? How would that discretion be limited? How should the
trial judge decide a motion? Drawing a distinction between pro se defendants
and defense counsel is an obvious attempt to address the concern that has
constricted the flow of information in the past: the fear that someone accused
of a crime will misuse it. 148 This conclusion is supported by the creation
within the Act of a duty of confidentiality for defense lawyers.1 4 9 The tension
between this fear and the desire to put useful information in the hands of the
defendant's attorney creates, in the newest version of article 39.14, an uneasy
balance that disadvantages the accused who wishes to act pro se.'
Also puzzling is the limitation in subsection (d), disallowing a pro se
defendant to electronically duplicate produced materials.s'5
Does the
possible ban on electronic duplication effectively reduce the unrepresented

143. See id.
144. See id (emphasis added).
145. See id. art. 39.14(d).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See cases cited supranote 19.
149.

See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(e)-(f).

150.
151.

See id.
See id. art. 39.14(d).
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to looking and writing notes?15 2 If so, it must be because a greater potential
for misuse was imagined when materials were electronically duplicated, but
the distinction is unexplained, and the term "electronic duplication" is
undefined.1 3 Since the language is only permissive, allowing, but not
requiring the prosecution to deny electronic duplication, the Texas
Legislature must not have thought the potential for misuse was especially
strong.
The division between defendants and their lawyers is also reflected in
subsection (f) of article 39.14.154 An attorney representing the accused is
permitted to view, copy, store, and otherwise use materials produced by the
state, but the defendant and witnesses may only see the information, not have
copies of anything other than his or her own statement.155 Information
relating to "the address, telephone number, driver's license number, social
security number, date of birth, and any bank account or other identifying
numbers" must be redacted before a defendant or witness is allowed to view
a document or item.156

It is the duty of the person who allows the defendant to see the produced
That person may be the
material to redact the proscribed information."'
defendant's lawyer, an investigator, expert, consulting legal counsel, or agent
for the defendant's lawyer.' 58 Interestingly, any of these people, and not only
the defense counsel, apparently may see the information that the defendant
cannot.159 If they do so, however, they and the defendant cannot share what
they learn outside this defense inner circle. 6 0
IX. THE DUTY NOT To DISCLOSE
Generally, material produced for defense use under the Act cannot be
disclosed by the recipients to a third party.16' This prohibition applies to "the
defendant, the attorney representing the defendant, or an investigator, expert,
consulting legal counsel, or other agent of the attorney representing the
defendant." 62 The ban is not absolute; a court may conduct a hearing and
order disclosure if "good cause" is shown and "the security and privacy
152. See Ranc, supra note 9, at 965-66. Photocopying, scanning, and photographing almost
universally involve electronic duplication in the sense that the images are captured and stored
electronically. See id Could a pro se defendant use a film camera to record images of the produced
materials as a matter of statutory right if the court ordered production?
153. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(d).
154. See id. art. 39.14(f).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. art. 39.14(e).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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interests of any victim or witness" have been considered.' 63 Again, the fear
of coercion, intimidation, or worse is the concern driving this policy.1 64
Revealing materials to third parties is also permitted in cases in which those
materials were previously disclosed to the public."'5
Beneath this precautionary policy lurks a more problematic reality for
defense lawyers and their clients. In an effort to protect victims and
witnesses, the Act creates not only a duty of nondisclosure for criminal law
practitioners but also a duty of security and confidentiality.' To be sure,
lawyers are accustomed to dealing with confidential materials and
information, and in many respects, the duty created by the Act imposes no
additional burden on the attorney who is already required to keep the secrets
of clients.' 6 7 It does create, though, the potential for this duty, which is shared
with the client, to become a source of conflict in the attorney-client
relationship.
For example, if a violation of the nondisclosure rule were to be claimed
by the state, the court surely would consider whether the breach occurred by
the actions of the accused, the defendant's attorney, or an agent of the
attorney. For the lawyer to dispute or defend against a claimed violation
presents the real possibility that he or she will be forced to point an accusing
finger at the lawyer's own client. The lawyer's defense might require
disclosure of otherwise privileged attorney-client communications, but even
if it did not, vigorously defending against an allegation of wrongful
disclosure would likely put the attorney's interests in conflict with those of
the client.16 8
Adding to the dilemma for the attorney are the uncertain consequences
of a violation. No crime was created by the Act to complement the
nondisclosure requirement, and the violation of the statutory duty might not
even constitute a disciplinary infraction by the lawyer.' 69 Contempt would
not be available to punish the errant defense lawyer unless a nondisclosure
163. See id. art. 39.14(e)(1).
164. See cases cited supra note 19.
165. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(e)(2).
166. See id art. 39.14(ef).
167.

see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05, reprintedin TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.,

tit. 2, subtit. G., app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9).
168. See id (describing privileged attorney-client communication). If the defendant told her attorney
after the fact that she had mentioned information obtained through discovery to a friend or family member
and asked whether that revelation was improper, it seems thefact that the disclosure was made would be
privileged because it constitutes an admission of legal wrongdoing made to the attorney to obtain legal
advice or counsel. See TEX. R. EVID. 503. Similarly, if defense counsel asks the client, "Now, you didn't
tell anyone any of those things we got from the prosecution, did you?" and the client responds, "Well, I
showed that witness statement to my brother so he could see what X was saying about me," isn't that
statement by the defendant privileged? Id. Or may the defense attorney reveal the statement to establish
that she did not disclose the witness statement, but rather that her client did? See TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c). And if she does disclose what she's been told, perhaps because any
privilege has been waived, isn't she still in a conflict with her own client? See id. R. 1.06.
169. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(e)-(f).
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order had been entered, and it is hard to see how the court's inherent
supervisory powers could be used to address the breach in a way that is
appropriate. Perhaps a trial court could bar the attorney from appearing
before that court in the future, or in a case in which wrongful disclosure
harmed some third party, the lawyer could be subject to tort liability.
Ironically, the defense lawyer who violates the nondisclosure provisions of
article 39.14 might be better off offering no defense to a claim by the state
than risking discipline by disclosing privileged information.1 70
The client, on the other hand, would face possible contempt proceedings
for the same violation if a nondisclosure order had been issued, but would
probably not face prosecution unless actual witness tampering occurred.
Should the attorney who is falsely accused of disclosing privileged
informati n gained through discovery be precluded from revealing that her
or his own client is the real culprit? Or should the lawyer risk a disciplinary
action or being held in contempt by defending herself without regard for the
consequerices to the client?
The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct define
"confidential information" to include both privileged and unprivileged
information, so the consideration is not simply one of determining whether
the client's statement is privileged as an evidentiary matter.171 Information
"acquired by the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the
representation of the client" may not be revealed or used to the disadvantage
of the client unless the client consents.1 72 Nor may the lawyer reveal
confidential information "for the advantage of the lawyer" without a client's
consent. 173
This general prohibition is tempered by permission to reveal
confidential information "[t]o the extent reasonably necessary to ... establish
a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and
the client," or "[t]o establish a defense to a ... disciplinary complaint against
the lawyer or the lawyer's associates based upon conduct involving the client
or the representation of the client. ,74 Unprivileged information may be
revealed "[w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in
order to . . defend the lawyer or the lawyer's employees or associates against
75 or to "respond to allegations in any
a claim of wrongful conduct"s
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.""' These
exceptions to the general prohibition against the revelation of confidential
information may provide a partial answer to the lawyer's dilemma when a
170.

See infra Part X.A. (explaining the prohibition on revealing privileged information).

171.
172.

See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a); TEX. R. EVID. 503.
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a)-(b).

173.
174.
175.
176.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

R.
R.
R.
R.

1.05(bX4).
1.05(c)(6)-(7).
1.05(d)(2)(ii) iii).
1.05(d)(2)(iii).
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client has wrongfully disclosed materials produced by the state, but the
Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules includes a reminder that the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality is not lightly abandoned:
[T]hese rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of
either the attorney-client or work product privilege. The fact that in
exceptional situations the lawyer under the Rules has a limited discretion to
disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general
matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to
the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such
information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with
recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. 77
Under the confidentiality rules, even if defense counsel may reveal that the
client violated the provisions of article 39.14 by disclosing produced
materials, doing so places the lawyer in the uncomfortable, and perhaps
prohibited, position of becoming the accuser of, and chief witness against,
the client.' 7 8 As the commentary to the rule regarding conflicts of interests
reminds members of the bar, "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client."' 79 The commentary also admonishes that "the
lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client," 80 and that a conflict exists "when a lawyer may
not be able to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action for one client because of the lawyer's own interests." 8 1 Obviously, a
lawyer who asserts that his or her client has violated the nondisclosure rule
of article 39.14 to save herself from disciplinary action or sanction by the
trial court, places her own interests above those of the client.
Curiously, the Act fails to create a crime or other sanction for violation
of its nondisclosure requirement.1 82 The absence of a prescribed enforcement
mechanism presents a challenge for the trial judge. If an attorney before the
court misbehaves by improperly disclosing information obtained from the
state, the court might refer the matter for possible attorney discipline or hold
the lawyer in contempt if the court's order was violated. 83 Presumably, a
sanction might issue using the court's general supervisory powers.18 4
Unfortunately, violation of a statutory duty in the course of legal
representation is not a per se disciplinary violation. And as previously noted,
177.
178.

See id. preamble ¶ 16.
See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b).

179.

See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 1.

180.
181.
182.
Sess.).
183.
184.

See id. cmt. 5.
See id. cmt. 4.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(g) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
See id.
See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.

§

2 1.001(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis. Sess.).
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the Act-by design-eliminates the need for a production order, thereby
reducing the opportunities to employ contempt as a sanction. 85
X. ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS: WHEN GOOD PROSECUTORS Go BAD

A. ProfessionalDiscipline
Just as the Act is silent regarding the remedies for violation of the
nondisclosure requirement by a defendant or his attorney, there is no remedy
provision in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, while article
39.14(g) refers to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
implying those rules apply to lawyers employing the Act, that subsection is
clearly addressed to attorneys for criminal defendants, and not to
prosecutors.1 8 6 Subsection (h), elaborated in subsection (k) of article 39.14,
codifies the requirement that prosecutors comply with Brady v. Maryland,
but even those provisions include no mention of an enforcement mechanism
to use in the event of a violation.'
Despite the absence of enforcement language within the Act, remedies
for misconduct exist. Rule 8.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct contains several applicable provisions:
A lawyer shall not violate the Disciplinary Rules;
A lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"; and
A lawyer shall not "engage in conduct constituting obstruction of

1.
2.
3.

justice.""'
A prosecutor who violates a requirement of article 39.14 by, for example,
failing to comply with an order of a court to produce certain evidence or
failing to meet his or her statutory obligation to produce items discoverable

185. See supra Part VI.
186. See CRM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(g). Subsection (g) begins by stating,
Nothing in this article shall be interpreted to limit an attorney's ability to communicate
regarding his or her case within the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, except
for the communication of information identifying any victim or witness, including
name, . . .address, telephone number, driver's license number, social security number, date of
birth, and bank account information or any information that by reference would make it
possible to identify a victim or a witness.
Id. This language reminds the reader that the disciplinary rules apply and implies that communication of
specified information would violate those rules. See id
187. See id. art. 39.14(h)-(k). The state has a duty to supplement disclosure of Brady material "at
any time before, during, or after trial." Id. art. 39.14(k). Article 39.14 does not directly provide for
violations of Brady, but Rule 3.09(d) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct does. See
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.09(d), reprintedinTEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit.
G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9).
188.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.09(d).
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under the Act when a timely defense request has been made has obstructed
justice.'89 That violation of Rule 8.04(a)(4) simultaneously violates the
prohibition on violations in the disciplinary rules.1 90
Lawyers also are not allowed to "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."1 91 While a prosecutor's
straightforward failure to comply with the requirements of article 39.14 is
only arguably dishonest and fraudulent because the conduct implies that no
discoverable material is in the possession of the state, an outright
misrepresentation of the existence of such material clearly violates Rule
8.04(a)(3).' 92 And it obstructs justice by denying the defendant and the court
access to evidence that may bear on the guilt or innocence of the accused or
impair the fairness of the proceedings.193
Although the preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct is hortatory, and not mandatory, § 4 admonishes lawyers: "A
lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal
affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate
purposes and not to harass or intimidate others."1 94 Failure to comply with a
legally established duty of production obviously constitutes a failure to
conform to the requirements of the law. If done to "harass or intimidate" a
defendant, the prosecutor acts contrary to the legislative intent, spirit, and
letter of article 39.14.195
More specific commands reside in Rules 3.04(a) and 3.09(d) of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.09(d) specifies
that a prosecutor shall
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and
to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal.' 6
Somewhat more broadly, Rule 3.04(a) commands that any lawyer, and not
only a prosecutor, shall not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to
evidence; in anticipation of a dispute unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material that a competent lawyer would believe has
189.

See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a)-(c).

190.

See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a).

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See
See
See
See
See

196.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09(d).

id. R. 8.04(a)(3).
id.
id. R. 8.04(a)(4).
id preamble 1 4.
S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
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potential or actual evidentiary value; or counsel or assist another person to
do any such act." 197 In a case of first impression, the Texas Board of
Disciplinary Appeals recently held that these provisions impose a broad
ethical duty on prosecutors to provide defendants with evidence in their
possession that may not qualify as "material" under the Brady standard.' 98
The prosecutor in that case, William Allen Schultz, was found to have known
that the key witness for the State could not identify the defendant directly as
the man who had attacked her, but Schultz failed to disclose that fact to the
defense.1 99 Schultz's partially probated suspension for violation of these
standards was affirmed.20 0
All prosecuting attorneys are required, and not merely exhorted, to
observe their "primary duty": "[N]ot to convict, but to see that justice is
done." 2 0 1 In some cases, this universally recognized duty may obligate a
public prosecutor to exceed the disclosure mandates of Brady and article
39.14, but it leaves no room for falling short. Yet in many cases that have
come to light, and others that continue to plague the fair administration of
justice in the United States, prosecutors have failed to comply with even the
minimal due process requirements of Brady.202 These failures led to
wrongful convictions in some cases, but in all cases the failures deprived the
defendants of the fair process to which every accused person is entitled.2 03

197. Id. R. 3.04(a).
198. See Schultz v. Comm. for Lawyer Discipline, No. 55649, Tex. Bd. of Disp. App. (Dec. 17,2015)
(noting that Rule 3.09(d) is broader than Brady).
199. Seeid.at2l.
200. See id.
201. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the United States Attorney is
a representative of a sovereignty whose interest is not in winning a case but in seeing that justice is done).
202. See Kozinski, supra note 4. Consider U.S. Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski's observation that
"there are disturbing indications that a non-trivial number of prosecutors-and sometimes entire
prosecutorial offices-engage in misconduct that seriously undermines the fairness of criminal trials." See
id. Judge Kozinski described these failings as "an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land." See
id. at xiii (quoting United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc)). In the recent Texas prosecution of David Temple for killing his wife, a state
district judge heard the defendant's habeas petition based on undisclosed exculpatory evidence and found
that the results would have been different had the State observed its obligation to reveal favorable evidence
to the defense. See Brian Rogers, Judge Upbraids Legendary Prosecutorin Katy Murder Case, Hous.
CHRON. (July 8, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article
/Judge-upbraids-legendary-prosecutor-in-Katy-6374049.php.
In an article reporting on that finding,
Joanne Musick, President of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association, was quoted as saying,
"Whether it's Morton or Graves or whoever, we see prosecutors who want to win, so they don't want to
disclose everything .... If they're hiding things or playing games, that's not upholding their duty to do
justice. That's trying to win." See id.
203. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongfid
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 399, 403. The prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration of Michael Morton is but one example of this kind of misconduct resulting
in wrongful conviction. See Colloff, Innocent Man, PartOne, supra note 45; Colloff, Innocent Man, Part
Two, supranote 45. Unfortunately, there are many others. See Joy, supra.
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Professional discipline has occasionally been imposed on errant
prosecutors 204 but is so sporadic and uneven that the possibility of sanction is
unlikely to effectively deter this type of misconduct. 205 If not discipline, then
what? Accustomed as American lawyers are to considering money damages
as an effective deterrent and enforcement tool, civil liability for disclosure
violations naturally comes to mind. The availability of this remedy, however,
is more limited than might be expected.
B. Civil Liability
The Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
makes clear that a violation of the Rules is not necessarily grounds for
liability: "These rules do not undertake to define standards of civil liability
of lawyers for professional conduct. Violation of a rule does not give rise to
a private cause of action nor does it create any presumption that a legal duty
to a client has been breached."2 06 If violation of a disciplinary rule does not
constitute a basis for civil liability by itself, a wrongfully convicted defendant
may conceivably have no recourse to attain damages from the attorney who
contributed to or caused that miscarriage of justice but may seek reparations

204. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Woman on Texas Death Row to be Re-sentenced; Life Term
Expected, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/11/
woman-on-texas-death-row-granted-new-hearing.html (describing how one prosecutor, under current
investigation for misconduct, was privately reprimanded for withholding evidence in the death penalty
case of Michael Roy Toney); see also Fla. Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278, 1285-87 (Fla. 2001) (imposing
a one-year suspension against a prosecutor for withholding the name of the informant); In re Kevin Caroll
Kakac, No. 6211262, IL Disp. Op. 07 SH 86 (Ill. Atty. Reg. Disp. Com.), 2010 WL 5624454 (imposing a
thirty-day suspension against a prosecutor for improperly withholding evidence); Brian Rogers,
Prosecutorin Anthony Graves Case Disbarred,HOUS. CHRON. (June 12, 2015, 1:33 PM), http://www.
chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Prosecutor-in-Anthony-Graves-case-disbarred-632368 1.
php (discussing a prosecutor who was disbarred for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence).
205. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxiii; see also Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of
Prosecutors,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3441, 3441-42 (1999) (arguing that professional discipline, as applied,
is insufficient to compensate for the broad grant of immunity from civil rights actions). In part, this failure
to discipline is due to the difficulty inherent in discovering the violations for reasons described in the
following passage:
Prosecutorial misconduct is a particularly difficult problem to deal with because so much of
what prosecutors do is secret. If a prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense, who is to know? Or if a prosecutor delays disclosure of evidence helpful to the
defense until the defendant has accepted an unfavorable plea bargain, no one will be the wiser.
Or if prosecutors rely on the testimony of cops they know to be liars, or if they acquiesce in a
police scheme to create inculpatory evidence, it will take an extraordinary degree of luck and
persistence to discover it-and in most cases it will never be discovered.
Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxiii. If discipline is rarely imposed on known instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, imagine the larger number of unknown cases that go unpunished. It is small wonder that
close adherence to discovery obligations may not be seen as a high priority by some prosecutors. Those
who do take great pains to follow the law of disclosure do so primarily for the right reasons and contribute
to the fair administration ofjustice in a way that may never be fully appreciated.
206.

See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 15, reprintedin TEX. Gov'T CODE

ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X,

§ 9).
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from the State of Texas instead. 207 As helpful as such an award could be to
the wrongfully convicted, it has no punitive effect-and therefore is unlikely
to have much deterrent value-with respect to the individual most likely to
have caused the harm.
Ordinarily, damages could be pursued against someone who, acting
under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.208 When a
prosecutor denies a criminal defendant due process by withholding
mitigating or potentially exculpatory evidence, he or she deprives that
defendant of such a right, but the remedies usually available under § 1983
offer no relief.
Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for activities "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 2 09 Qualified
immunity, a powerful defense in its own right, was initially recognized for
conduct by prosecutors acting in an administrative or investigative
capacity.210 In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court of the United States
explained:
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same
considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and
grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties. These include concern
that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the
prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he
would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of
judgment required by his public trust. 2 11
The Court continued to explain why qualified immunity would ordinarily be
insufficient to protect the public prosecutor from fear of frivolous and
vexatious litigation, and impede the pursuit of criminal justice.2 12
Subsequently, in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, the Court extended absolute
immunity to a district attorney and his chief deputy for clearly administrative
duties: the failure to establish an information-sharing system on jailhouse

207. See generally TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-.054 (West 2011).
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (discussing what
constitutes acting under color of state law).
209. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Williams, supra note 205, at
3452-53 (discussing when absolute immunity applies).
210. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; see also Williams, supra note 205, at 3454 (defining qualified
immunity and discussing when it applies).
211. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23.
212. See id at 424-27. This holding has had its detractors. Among them is Judge Alex Kozinski,
who observed that the ruling was neither a constitutional ruling nor one "compelled by the language of
the statute." Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxxix. It was, Judge Kozinski wrote, "a pure policy judgment."
Id.; see also Williams, supranote 205, at 3479-80 (arguing that qualified immunity is sufficient to protect
prosecutors and that absolute immunity should be abolished).
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informants within their office and the failure to train prosecutors properly
regarding their disclosure obligations under Giglio v. United States.213
Absolute immunity from § 1983 liability strips the criminally accused,
as well as the wrongfully convicted, of the only remedy that is likely to be
effective,214 a point the Imbler court acknowledged:
To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest
action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a
prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would
prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that
is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.
Moreover, it often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by skewing
post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose
of insuring justice. 215
This observation, whatever its merits, focused on acts and omissions
respecting an attorney's conduct in a particular prosecution. The question
left unanswered was whether a district attorney and his or her employing
governmental entity might be liable for § 1983 damages due to failure to train
prosecutors about their duty to disclose. That issue came to the fore in
Connick v. Thompson.216 Notwithstanding a record of providing prosecutors
within his office inadequate, and sometimes incorrect, information about the
requirements of Brady and the absence of a single case in his office in which
a prosecutor was disciplined for a violation, the Supreme Court refused to
find sufficient evidence that the district attorney was "deliberately
indifferent" to the rights of the defendant. 217 In the absence of a pattern of
indifference toward the due process rights Brady sought to guarantee, as
opposed to a single instance, the case for § 1983 liability is not established,

213. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338 (2009); see also Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (discussing an obligation to disclose relevant information).
214. See Williams, supra note 205, at 3455-56 (arguing that professional discipline does not
adequately compensate for broad prosecutorial immunity); see also George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REv. 199, 231 (2011) (stating that absolute
immunity, which almost always applies, is the "main reason the threat of civil liability is not an adequate
deterrent to prosecutorial misconduct").
215. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28. This last observation regarding possible "skewing" of postconviction decisions suggests, with surprising candor, that appellate judges might ignore or undervalue
meritorious claims of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in a denial of due process because the reviewing
judges would wish to spare the trial prosecutor the burden of liability for damages. See id
216. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
217. See id. at 98-100 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The record in Connick established an appalling and
dangerous misunderstanding and neglect of the prosecutor's ethical obligation to produce exculpatory and
mitigating evidence. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion describes in detail the environment leading to
the wrongful conviction in this case. See id. at 79-109.
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barring a wrongfully convicted plaintiff from recovering damages even from
the governmental entity responsible for the violation.2 1 8
The limitations on civil liability, particularly a prosecutor's immunity,
effectively remove damages as an enforcement tool for violations-a point
not lost on the Supreme Court.219 Writing for the majority in Imbler, Justice
Powell noted that alternatives to the civil remedy exist: criminal prosecution
and professional discipline. 22 0 The latter option was accompanied by the
following observation from the Imbler majority:
[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could
deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional
discipline by an association of his peers. These checks [(criminal
prosecution and professional discipline)] undermine the argument that the
imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are
mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime. 221
The optimism of this passage has been questioned, and with good
reason. 22 2 In an empirical study conducted by Professor Fred Zacharias, the
evidence suggested that prosecutors not only were less likely to be
disciplined than attorneys handling civil matters, but that even when they are
disciplined, it is rarely for conduct resulting from excessive zeal.223 A survey
of cases reported in news accounts, and in opinions by courts and disciplinary
entities, reveals that prosecutors rarely suffer professional discipline, even in
cases including wrongful conviction.22 4
In his review of enforcement alternatives for prosecutorial misconduct,
George Weiss summarized the effectiveness of professional discipline as a
curb on rule violations by noting, "Whether on the logical or empirical side,
it seems bar sanctions are unlikely to restrain misconduct due to their low
probability of occurring and because lighter sanctions are often imposed

218. See id. at 69-72 (majority opinion).
219. See generally Martin A. Schwartz, The Supreme Court's UnfortunateNarrowing of the Section
1983 Remedy for Brady Violations, CHAMPION, May 2013, at 58, http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.
Aspx?id=28482 (discussing how the Imbler, Goldstein, and Connick immunity grants effectively
eliminate consequences for prosecutorial misconduct).
220. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428-29.
221. See id. at 429.
222. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 223-25 (attorney-discipline authorities are less likely to bring
charges or successfully inflict sanctions against prosecutors for prosecutorial misconduct). Judge Alex
Kozinski characterized the argument as "dubious in 1976" and "absurd" today. See Kozinski, supra note
4, at xxxix.

223. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 223-25; Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 754-57 (2001).
224. In reported claims of prosecutorial misconduct by sixty prosecutors in wrongful conviction cases
reviewed by myself and my research assistant, Sarah Bassler, only eight resulted in disciplinary action.
This low discipline rate exists despite the fact that in virtually every instance, the prosecution withheld
exculpatory or mitigating evidence. An investigation was still pending in only one of these cases. It is
noteworthy that thirty-three of the claims were from Texas, and only three of those resulted in discipline.
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when they do occur." 225 Other enforcement mechanisms seem not to fare any
better.
C. CriminalProsecution
The federal criminal analog to § 1983 is 18 U.S.C. § 242.226 Like its
civil counterpart, § 242 provides a criminal sanction for persons acting under
color of law who deprive another of a right, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed by the Constitution or laws. 227 Similarly, Texas criminal law
punishes public servants and others for various kinds of conduct that may be
involved in hiding or failing to divulge to a defendant information to which
the accused is entitled.228
One need not be cynical to believe that criminal prosecution is unlikely
to be an effective deterrent to Brady or Michael Morton Act violations.
George Weiss asserted in his 2011 article on enforcement mechanisms that
only one conviction of a prosecutor for violating § 242 has been secured since
the enactment of the statute. 229 In that case, In re Brophy, the sentence was a
$500 fine with no jail time, and the errant prosecutor received only a censure
from the New York Bar's disciplinary authority. 230
The reticence to prosecute, whether in federal or state court, is perhaps
understandable given that the authorities who exercise prosecutorial
discretion would be similarly jeopardized by widespread use of the
sanction.23 1 It also has been suggested that prosecution of a public servant
might be overkill if the defendant who was denied access to materials to
which she was entitled was subsequently convicted in a new trial.2 32 But this
argument misses the point that the intentional withholding of Brady material
or information covered by article 39.14 harms the accused in a very real way,
and that harm is unlikely to be undone merely because the injured party
eventually obtains what she was entitled to receive in the first place. Refusal

225. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 225; see also Williams, supra note 205, at 3441 (arguing that case
law after Imbler suggests professional discipline does not sufficiently compensate for immunity from civil
rights actions).
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10 (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis. Sess.)
(tampering with governmental records); id. § 37.09 (tampering with or fabricating physical evidence); id.
§ 39.03(a)(2) (abuse of official capacity); id § 39.04(a)(1) (violations of the civil rights of a person in
custody).
229. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 220.
230. See In re Brophy, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (deeming censure adequate in
light of an "unblemished record" and the stigma of criminal conviction).
231. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 221. No instance of criminal conviction for prosecutorial
misconduct has been found in Texas. See Brandi Grissom, Study: Prosecutors Not Disciplinedfor
Misconduct, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/03/29/study-prosecutors-notdisciplined-misconduct/.
232. See Weiss, supra note 214, at 220.
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to prosecute also removes, even in egregious cases, the deterrent value that
might otherwise exist. 233

D. Other Means ofEnforcement
If criminal prosecution is essentially nonexistent, why did prosecutor
Michael Nifong serve one day in jail and former Williamson County District
Attorney Ken Anderson serve five days jail time? 23 4 In both cases, the short
jail stay was for criminal contempt, and not as a punishment following
conviction of a crime. 235 Although contempt seems scarcely more available
than prosecution for violations of disclosure requirements, it may take on
some life in the age of mandatory disclosure ushered in by the Michael
Morton Act.
If contempt is to gain relevance in the post-Morton world, it will be
because defendants seek and obtain from trial courts orders to produce
evidence, and because judges enforce those orders. Although, as previously
described, article 39.14 is designed to avoid the involvement of the trial judge
in the initial discovery process, routine motions and orders to produce
discoverable materials may facilita te enforcement against willful breaches of
the statutory duty. 236 This point is reflected in a passage by United States
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski regarding Brady violations in the case against
former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens:
Brady is not self-enforcing; failure to comply with Brady does not expose
the prosecutor to any personal risk. When Judge Sullivan discovered that
the prosecutors in the [United States v.] Stevens case had obtained their

conviction after failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, he appointed a
special counsel, DC attorney Henry Schuelke III, to independently
investigate the prosecutors' conduct. Schuelke determined that the lawyers
had committed willful Brady violations but that the court lacked the power
to sanction the wrongdoers because they had not violated any court-imposed
obligations.
The solution to this problem is for judges to routinely enter Brady
compliance orders, and many judges do so already. 237

233. Idat221.
234. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the DisbarmentofMike
Nifong: The CriticalImportance ofFull Open-FileDiscovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257, 308 (2008).
Michael Nifong was the prosecutor in the notorious Duke University Lacrosse case in which players were
falsely accused of rape. Id. at 257. Mr. Nifong, disbarred for his misconduct, was found to have withheld
potentially exculpatory DNA evidence. Id. at 317-18. The publicity this case received, not unlike that of
the Michael Morton case, resulted in North Carolina's adoption of a mandatory open-file policy. Id. at
272.
235. See Kozinski, supranote 4, at xxxix n.21 1.
236. See supraPart IV.
237. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxxiii (footnotes omitted).
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Courts also are free to promulgate local rules under their supervisory
powers. Violations of these rules may be punished in a variety of ways,238
and although they lack the uniformity of state or federal rules, they are
potentially useful in addressing and deterring prosecutorial misconduct. 239
Other disincentives to violate article 39.14 are somewhat less formal but
could be equally effective if applied consistently and appropriately. These
include the prospect of public disclosure of the violation, especially in
instances of wrongful conviction; internal disciplinary measures within the
prosecuting office or by county, state, or municipal officials; and loss of
reputation within the legal community.240
Without effective enforcement measures for violations of Brady and
article 39.14, compliance will be a low priority for some prosecutors, and an
invitation to cheat for others.
As Judge Alex Kozinski observed,
"Prosecutors need to know that someone is watching over their shoulderssomeone who doesn't share their values and eat lunch in the same
cafeteria." 24 1 If prosecutors, judges, and the public view the actions of
criminal defense lawyers with too much suspicion, actions of prosecutors
may be viewed with too little. No profession fares well on naked assumptions
of competence and good faith, and no rule has life and vitality without
enforcement.
XI. REALIZING THE PROMISE
The 2013 amendments to article 39.14 significantly and substantially
changed both the law and practice of criminal discovery in Texas. Like all
reform efforts, however, work remains to be done if the Act is to fulfill its
promise to Michael Morton and the citizens of Texas. The legislature should,
for example, carefully reconsider the disparate ways in which represented
defendants, pro se defendants, and lawyers for defendants are treated. The
statute must more clearly delineate when the discovery right of a defendant
differs from that of a defendant's lawyer.

238. See Williams, supra note 205, at 3446. Sanctions might include dismissal of a prosecution or
the exclusion ofevidence. Id. at 3447; see also State v. Sanchez, No. 08-13-00010-CR, 2014 WL 2090546
at *12 (Tex. App.-El Paso May 16, 2014, pet. refd) (not designated for publication) (illustrating how
the trial court ordered suppression of evidence for failure of prosecution to disclose Brady material; the
appellate court reversed after finding that the failure to comply with the court's discovery order was not
willful).
239. See Williams, supra note 205, at 3444 (discussing how rules adopted under the supervisory
power of courts have sometimes been promulgated in response to violations by prosecutors).
240. See id at 3445 (explaining that federal prosecutors are subject to internal regulations and ethical
standards). But Williams also notes that prosecutors "may be inherently too biased to ensure fair
disciplinary review." Id. at 3478.
241. See Kozinski, supranote 4, at xxxii.
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The restrictive approach taken in the statute toward pro se defendants
must be clarified. If the ban on "electronic duplication" is maintained, the
scope of that limitation must be defined.242
Requiring production not less than ten days before the beginning of the
trial would ensure that defendants at least have time to see and use the
information that is provided. And perhaps defendants and their lawyers
should be obliged to expressly waive discovery in writing if no request has
been made because they are not seeking production.
What Judge Kozinski has said of Brady applies with equal force to the
reforms undertaken in the Michael Morton Act:
[T]hree ingredients must be present before we can be sure that the
prosecution has met its Brady obligations under the law applicable in most
jurisdictions. First, you must have a highly committed defense lawyer with
significant resources at his disposal. Second, you must have a judge who
cares and who has the gumption to hold the prosecutor's feet to the fire
when a credible claim of misconduct has been presented. And, third, you
need a great deal of luck, or the truth may never come out.243
The same may be said of article 39.14's obligations of confidentiality
imposed on defendants and their attorneys. As is true generally in the
criminal justice system, if-and only if-all of the principles in the
administration ofjustice perform in ways consistent with the letter and spirit
of this reform measure, Texas will enjoy a more open, transparent, and fair
process. Texas will not eliminate wrongful convictions merely by valuing
truth-finding more highly than it has been in the past. There are many other
ways in which we arrive at unjust prosecutions, convictions, and
punishments. But we must not sacrifice the good because we are unable to
achieve the perfect.
Even highly committed defense lawyers without significant resources
can better protect their clients and create a remedial opportunity for the trial
judge by filing a motion for production under article 39.14 and Brady. Trial
judges are free, of course, to routinely order such disclosure in cases before
them.244 Specifying what must be disclosed simultaneously documents the
242. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 84th Reg. Legis.
Sess.).
243. See Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxvi. My St. Mary's colleague, Professor John Schmolesky,
would simplify and strengthen the enforcement of Brady by removing materiality as a predicate to a due
process claim. He suggests that (1) if the government has Brady material that (2) is in its possession, a
per se violation should be established. Appellate or habeas review of the violation then should proceed
on the basis of whether the failure to disclose was harmless error. The implementation and enforcement
advantages gained by this approach rest in eliminating the decision by local prosecutors whether a piece
of information is "material" within the meaning of Brady. This approach would streamline the processing
of Brady disclosure requests, and prosecutors seemingly would be more inclined to produce materials if
doubt about the need to do so existed.
244. See CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(e)(1).

928

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:893

request and affords the court the option to punish noncompliance by
contempt. Alternatively, the legislature could amend article 39.14 to provide
that failure to comply with its provisions subjects the violator to contempt.
Defense lawyers and defendants would thereby also be accountable for
violations of the nondisclosure duty created by the Act.
Courts must use the tools currently available to enforce compliance with
article 39.14 more vigorously, if not expand them. Professional discipline
holds potential as an effective deterrent, but only if it is applied uniformly,
certainly, and swiftly. It has been suggested that existing disciplinary rules
are inadequate to address prosecutorial misconduct, both because they fail to
directly address the kinds of misconduct that may lead to wrongful
convictions245 and because they usually do not apply to prosecutors.246 Rules
designed specifically to address violations of Brady and article 39.14
disclosure obligations could significantly increase the likelihood that courts
will impose professional discipline, especially if they are accompanied by
reporting requirements imposed on trial and appellate courts encountering
such a breach.247
It is also time to rethink immunity from civil liability for blatant
misconduct. Whether this recalibration is achieved by qualifying immunity
for prosecutors instead of maintaining an absolute shield, or by modulating
the degree of immunity depending on the errant official's bad faith and
culpability, the potential and actual harm that results from a conviction at any
price is simply too great to disallow accountability altogether.248 If the
Supreme Court of the United States is not yet satisfied that Imbler created too
strong a defense for ethical lapses, the State of Texas could, and should,
consider whether the state governments reparations to the vrongfully
convicted would be more fairly imposed on the offices and indiv duals who
ignore the legal duties created by the state legislature, the Constitution, and
notions of fundamental fairness.
Even criminal prosecution should be available for egregious
violations.249 If the state prosecutes other public officials for breaclies of duty
and ethical failings with far less serious consequences, prosecution for
violations of the very laws prosecutors are sworn to uphold-violations for

245. See Williams, supra note 205, at 3464-67 (describing the variety of prosecutorial misconduct
that is subject to neither professional discipline nor criminal prosecution).
246. See id. at 3464-76 (explaining how and why ethics violations are not enforced against
prosecutors).
247. See id. at 3477-80 (discussing the reluctance of professional bodies to discipline prosecutors for
unethical conduct and giving recommendations, including specific rules and mandatory reporting, to
counter violations of Brady and other kinds of misconduct).
248. See id. at 3479-80 (arguing that only qualified immunity should be available for prosecutorial
misconduct).
249. See id at 3476 ("Even when a prosecutor's misconduct is arguably a criminal act such as
suboming perjury or obstructing justice, enforcement against prosecutors is rare.").
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which they prosecute others every day-must also be an option in practice,
and not only in theory.
In criminal cases, it is time to temper adversarial habits with the
recognition on both sides that nothing is of more importance to the credibility
of the American criminal justice system than rigorously hewing to the rule of
law-not even doing justice in the individual case. Every wrongful
conviction, every subversion of the search for truth, undermines society's
confidence that criminal justice in Texas is not just a rigged lottery in which
the stakes are incredibly high. The Michael Morton Act is not a panacea for
these ills, but it has the potential to instill a heightened reliability into a
system damaged by its revealed flaws.250

250. The National Registry of Exonerations recently reported that in 2015, Texas led the nation in
exonerations by a wide margin. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015 5
(2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations-in2015.pdf. Of the 54
Texas exonerations studied by the National Registry, 6 were attributed to "official misconduct." Other
bases for exoneration also surely included incomplete or nonexistent disclosure of potentially exculpatory
evidence. Id. Three-fourths of exonerations in homicide cases nationwide in 2015 were attributed to
official misconduct. See Editorial, Wrongful Convictions Point to Flaws, MYSA (Feb. 20, 2016,
12:00 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Wrongful-convictions-point-toflaws-6843098.php.

